protecting our facility ran from the scene and took 90 minutes before we get help. unfortunately as i said earlier, one of the things we ran into -- that was a bad bad plan. the unit of the libyan government initially designated for vip protection. >> i hope these hearings will result in us not having to my on the best of bad plans and we can forfolks like mr. thompson what they were intended and secure our personnel. i see i am out of time. theo to the chairman of resources committee, mr. hastings. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

let me add my voice to my colleagues. thank you for your service. it should go without saying, but nonetheless we do appreciate it. you have answered this, so i just wanted clarification. there was a lawyer who came in who is not allowed to go to the because he was not qualified. the state department sent in this lawyer. were you told why the lawyer was sent? >> it to participate in all the meetings and all events associated with the congressman's visit. never have occurred before in my career. did the state department say the lawyer was going to come and participate in all of the meetings?

you were told that? yes. >> you mentioned the town of the state department changed probably after the rice interview. >> it began to change. >> give us examples of how things changed. have my management style counseled by assistant secretary jones. when she visited, she counseled me on my management style sang the staff was upset. there was no indication of staff being upset. again, when i returned to washington, she delivered a very blistering critique of my style and again exclaimed saying, i do not know why larry pope would want you back. >> that leads to an obvious question.

2012,to september 10th, had you received any negative feedback from your superiors? no. chris trusted me, i trusted him. we worked together very well. morale was high. >> i suppose in a career as long as your as you might have some disagreement with your superiors. was it to the extent that you felt you were treated after this event, last september, compared to maybe prior this agreement to have with your superiors? of 1-10, 10 being the worst -- >> 10. >> i guess that is what i want to follow up on. feel inioned that you the job you have, it's really a

demotion from the qualifications you have had in your career in the services. have you spoken to many of your colleagues are senior leaders in the state department regarding this? if so, what were those conversations about? after a couple of friends outside the department intervened with senior officials deputymy situation, secretary burns said that would be taken care row. the same thing that larry pope indicated. -- said that i would be taken care of. i met with the assistant secretary for human resources and i talked to him about what options might be available to me. basically the answer was i would have to go through the normal bidding process for assignments and persuade someone that i should be hired.

and then the conversation with deputy secretary burns was centered around discussions i had had with the leadership of our embassy in mexico city about getting in job there that would be a very good job. he said that he would support that, but i had to go through the process, and it's a very long process because the position is that a higher grade. >> i understand there are protocols, but does that strike you as unusual, someone with your background in the position that you had in libya and other areas? >> i was surprised that i was having to go through the normal process. especially when the ambassador in mexico city had talked to deputy secretary bonds about -- barnes about bringing me on as his counsel. >> if there is any retribution,

my words not yours, that you would have full support of your colleagues and i land them my support and, i think, the support of everyone here. bipartisan support of someone who has a difference of agreements on a policy issue or decision that killed four americans deserves to have whatever we can give to you, so thank you so much. my time is expired. asknd the time we can witnesses to stay seated with out a break has also expired. for those able to get up and go back and forth, we will take about 10 minutes. you can either go through that door or this door to use facilities available without going out into the public and then we will reconvene in about 10 minutes. thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]

>> the committee will come to order again. that we expected to have votes on house floor at approximately 5:00. we can work until about five minutes into the vote, after that we will adjourn. the expectation is we will not come back. for r three witnesses, the families, the attorneys, let me assure you, the end is in sight. gentleat, we go to the lady from wyoming. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank you for this long day. to the families, i offer my most sincere condolences from my constituents. they think about you all the time. do i understand that you have responsibility for while you wereya

there? >> correct. in july?ft >> correct. >> before you left, did you make security recommendations to washington, d.c.? >> we do an internal rockport, but that is not really a place where we put recommendations. it is more laying out the situation, the crime, the political situation and a lot of that reporting i have done previously with washington. >> they had recommendations from you or not? >> it is my understanding, yes. they wanted a transition plan specifically on how we were going to transition to our local bodyguards. that was submitted to them february 15th. was that implementation plan

accepted? was implemented? >> i never really got any feedback from washington. that is one thing that surprised me when i left post. i was never contacted by ds leadership for management from the time i left until this date. the only interaction i had was preparing before the october hearing, but they never contacted me to talk about libya, suggestions, anything like that. mr. hicks, do you know security recommendations are implemented? where there recommendations that are implemented? >> they were following up on many of the things that eric was working on before to strengthen our security posture in libya. after the attacks, john and i worked on and list of physical

security improvements that had to be made in tripoli in order for us to remain. i cabled that list in to the department after the congressman's visit and i learned later that cable was not well received by washington leadership's. to their credit, when they saw tot cable, they sent it undersecretary kennedy and insisted every recommendation in the cable be implemented. >> i want to switch gears a little bit. mr. hicks, are you aware of any efforts by department officials to limit department witness's access to information about the attacks prior to their testimony before congress? >> i never seen the classified report, so when my respect, yes.

mr. nordstrom, do you know whether the state department consciously sought to limit your awareness of certain information prior to your testimony before this committee? >> on not aware of that. me ask you this. i want to read you an excerpt from an e-mail ambassador stephen sent to you. this was july 5th, 2012. it was a draft cable intended to address an extension of security personnel for the embassy, ultimately sent on july 9th. the ambassador wrote, gentlemen, i've taken a close look at the table, edited it down and my intention was to give more focus to what we're doing to end our

reliance on tdy support and let the department figure out how to staff our needs. it looks ok, run this by ds to see if they want this front channel. mr. nordstrom, can you explain what ambassador stephen demands when he asked you to run it by ds to see if they wanted "front channel?" >> that is the process by which we would send officials department cable. for prayer it requests and it was my advice that we would in fact send that front channel. within the department, that is considered to be the official record. if i sense something by e-mail or informally discussed by telephone, it is still valuable, but unless it is on the cable, it's not official. my experience in the past was as soon as we put those

recommendations, as greta alluded to come as soon as we put that on an official cable, somehow we were seen as embarrassing the department of state because we are requiring them to live up to their end of the bargain. >> we now go to the gentleman from georgia. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i add my thanks to the gentleman on the panel. and i have heard it over and over again, but only because we believe it. we're grateful to you, not just for being here today, but for your decades upon decades of service. i know people at u.s. posts across the world are competent. there are men and women who do what you do who lives by a code that says, if you are in harm's way that we will come for you. i thank you very much for that commitment. >> thank you. >> mr. nordstrom, a follow up on

my colleague's question from wyoming, early july, 2012. recall your back-and- forth it particularly? >> vividly. >> what did you think of that decision making process? for those decisions being kicked up to a higher level? >> it was unclear. but onelargely in was, thing that struck me through the entire time that i was in libya was a strange decision making process, specifically, again, the undersecretary for management in many ways dealing directly with the director. as her supervisor two levels ahead, they had the ability to do that. , but it was strange that there is that direct relationship. i never really saw interaction from the assistant d.a. or are

director. it was even more clear in october when we were all sitting up here and there were two levels, if you will come about were not reflected and it was quite a jump between that plan and undersecretary kennedy. that anythinglt they were deciding certainly had been run by undersecretary kennedy. >> given the seriousness of that conversation, extending security support, did you receive an explanation for why the request was denied that satisfy you? >> i did not. as i testified before, what i perceived that it was some kind of explanation that it would be somehow embarrassing more politically difficult for the state department to continue to rely on dod and there was an element of that, but it was never verbalized, but that was

certainly the feeling that i got from that conversation. moving these discussions from back channel to front channel, was the nature of your conversation with the ambassador? this was such a serious issue that, rather than leaving it with a negative, he wanted to elevated? >> that's exactly what it is. i recall back to our first meeting with the congressman and chairman. that was the question that i think they posed to me. the new issues going to keep saying no, why did you keep asking? because of the right thing to do and it was resources that were needed. the people on the other side felt was the right thing to do, to say no, that could have had the courtesy to put that in the official record. what did you receive any feedback from washington whether a direct answer to the cable or the fact that you raised it to the front channel process?

>> by the time we sent the one in july, i did not receive a response. that cable was never responded to, which is something that is relatively unheard of. when you send a request cable for anything, a copier, a manpower request, they get back to you. i had a number of conversations wherey regional director it was a discouraging, to put it mildly, about why you keep raising these issues and moving this forward. >> if you could characterize this between non-response and it is agreement, when it comes to these issues of security for american personnel on the ground in libya, were you receiving a non-response from washington, or disagreement with your assessment of levels of need on the ground? >> i largely got a non-response.

the responses that i did get were that you did not have specific targetting, specific threats against you. the long and short as you are not dealing with suicide , andrs, incoming artillery vehicle bombs like they are in iraq and afghanistan. time hasntleman's expired. we now go to the gentleman from illinois, mr. davis. much, mr.ou very chairman. this is a long day with lots of questions and answers that have been shared, but let me ask the gentleman on this panel. last week, an unidentified individual described as a military special ops member appeared on national television to give an interview on the military's response to the attack in benghazi. the man appeared behind a black

screen in order to conceal his identity. he suggested that military assets in europe could have prevented the second attack in benghazi, specifically saying, "i know for a fact that the commandercommand cif and extremist force was during a training exercise not in the region of north africa but in europe. they had the ability to react and respond. he further stated, we have the birds, to get on aircraft, and fly their." they have the ability to be there, in my opinion, in four or six hours. he went on to conclude that they would have been there before the second attack. are any of you gentlemen familiar with this claim?

>> i saw on television. investigate the claim, last week, ranking member cummings road a letter to secretary hagel asking for the department's response and we have now received a written response from the department and i would like to enter that letter into the record, mr. chairman. >> we will take it under advisement. i have not seen it. >> in response to the allegation that the force could have arrived in benghazi prior to the initiation of the second attack on the amex, the time needed from alerting the forced to land at the benghazi airport is greater than the approximately 7.5 hours between the initiation of the first attack and that of the second.

the letter also states that the time requirements for notification for loading in transit alone prevented the cif to be at the amex in times enough to change these events. -- at the annex. does anyone disagree with that statement? >> the only thing i would add to that, not being privy to the decisions on the ground is that what is valuable is none of us, including the committee, had those details but for the person coming forward making that allegation. that minorityint leader cummings made. we're going to continue to see this kind of allegations because people do not feel that the answers have been provided or that they have been provided in a credible way.

it is much more important to get it done in this manner. >> thank you very much. trying to be consistent with the report that says, and die quote, "they found no evidence in delays of a response militaryt from the combatant commanders. the safe evacuation of all u.s. government personnel from benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack and, subsequently, this was the result of exceptional u.s. government coordination and military response to help save the lives of two severely wounded americans. that't know who unidentified individual was on fox news, but according to the defense department, his claim is

incorrect. mr. chairman, i simply wanted to get that into the record. >> will the gentleman yield? >> yes. unyielding to miss maloney. >> thank you very much. by all accounts, embassador stevens was a remarkable man. were you aware of how dangerous it was in benghazi? were you aware how dangerous it was coming yet he still made the decision to go there? but the gentle lady's time has expired. you may answer. >> yes, the ambassador is a very well aware of the situation in benghazi. before we went, we had the chance to operate with the officer. >> the gentleman from kentucky. >> mr. chairman, thank you for holding these hearings.

and has been said that all is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing. we have three very good man here going beyond the call of duty to come here to testify today and have my commitment to protect them from any retribution that may come from this. i get a sense there may be other people listening to the testimony today who have answers we do not have yet and i would encourage them to come forward does well. we have gotten a lot of good dancers today thanks to these witnesses. i would like to start with mr. thompson. i am struck by her long and distinguished career of hostage rescue missions and some of these missions are still classified, but they were successful. in your mind is where you were when these events began to unfold? >> at my desk in the state department. asked to marshal the resources for the team to help with the rescue effort, did you

not? >> yes, my first call was to the national security council. >> in your testimony you were told that it was not the correct time. >> when i referred the question to the undersecretary for management's office, yes. >> if this was not the right time, when would be so? this is a source of frustration that the american public has, that i have. we are the greatest country in the world and we let people defend fortially themselves when we had the resources. when would be the right time if it was not then? "there's no answer. staying with the topic of time, in an uncertain situation like this crisis when we do not know what's going to unfold, was

there sufficient communication that you could have pulled back emission ready to deploy? -- a mission? >> we practice this twice per year, a complete deployment and this is staffed with interagency professionals. the answer to your question is, yes. the plan funded by dod has a robust communications suite. the senior communicator on their works for me and he's a very competent man added job. >> i know you have not been allowed or review to even contribute to the accountability review board's report, but are you convinced that changes have been made so that this will not happen again for another embassy? >> no. >> that's troubling to me and i

appreciate your candor. mr. hicks camille mentioned at 2:00 a.m., you have a phone conversation of secretary clinton. is that correct? >> yes. >> did she ask what resources you might be able to use or might need? >> she did. we asked for security reinforcements and transporting our wounded out of the country to a medical facility. >> was there any indication that you would receive air support? that the marine team was being deployed to bolster our security posture in tripoli and that a c-17 would be coming down to take people back. >> no immediate military response? >> the marines were on their way and they would be arriving later on the 12th. >> did you tell the

accountability review board about secretary clinton's interest in establishing a permanent presence in benghazi? ostensibly, wasn't that the reason the ambassador was going to benghazi? >> yes, i did tell the accountability review board that. wanted thelinton post made permanent and ambassador pickering was surprised. he looked both ways to the members on the board asking if the seventh floor new about it. another factor in his decision was the understanding that secretary clinton intended to visit tripoli in november. thatckering was surprised his mission was to establish a permanent facility there? >> yes. >> that your impression? >> yes. >> will the gentleman yield? i just want you to say one

reason the- the ambassador was in benghazi, at least one reason -- >> at least one reason he was in benghazi was to further the secretary's wish that the post become a permanent constituent post. also we understood the secretary intended to visit tripoli later in the year. tohoped she would be able announce to the libyan people are establishment of a permanent constituent post in benghazi at that time. >> thank you. >> will the gentleman yield? >> i thank the gentleman for yielding. we now go to the gentleman from georgia. >> thank you, mr. chair, and i appreciate it. it's been a long day and there have been some interesting thing said. something that concerns me that

these hearings have not found a smoking gun or even a warm slingshot. i, for one, and not looking for those things. i'm looking for the truth, what happened that night. the one in have found, it may not be a smoking gun, but we have four dead americans and that's what this is about, finding out what happened so we can move forward in the future and i appreciate your willingness to be here. the truth is important, even now. mr. nordstrom, i want to follow up on a question for mr. .angford earlier about a cable yes to about the intended recipients. did you expect secretary clinton to have read or be briefed about the cable? >> absolutely. i expected, given the fact that she had an involvement in the security process, if i can take

a step back? by virtue of having the team there, because they were a department of defense asset, the process required for that is an from one a request cabinet head to another, in this case state to the defense. that request must be signed by the cabinet had. have done the initial deployment request plus an extension in the fall. and a second extension would have been in february. she came to tour the facilities and saw the lack of security there, something that she was briefed on by the country team as she visited the site. later, there were the attacks against the facilities. certainly, there's a reasonable expectation her staff would

have briefed them on the points. >> could this be concerned about a dod presence being an embarrassment in an embassy? a short answer there. >> that's the way i took it. >> i have another question that has kind of been asked before. in establishing a permanent presence in benghazi, give me a quick flavor of what those discussions were like. >> crystal me in his exit interview with the secretary after he was sworn in, the secretary said we need to make benghazi permanent post and he said, i will make it happen. >> was washington informed of the ambassador's plan to travel to benghazi? >> washington was billion from the ambassador was going and we advised them august 22nd or thereabouts. >> any concerns? given the timing and everything?

>> there were none. >> based on your experiences in libya, do you believe that they remain in danger in such high threat countries such as libya? serviceieve foreign officers serve a country where they need to be and in some places the risk they're taking is very high. >> in light of what we are seeing now, could this be avoidable from our lessons learned? , theom lessons learned security needs to be increased. but we need to increase strength, practices, training. again, and may not be quite understanding the question. needs to beou think done to read something like this from happening again? is it being taken advantage of or is there a denial process

going on here? >> i think we have more to do. more than what has been for what - put forward by the arb recommendations. >> this is something i think we can flush out over time. dod influence, as has been mentioned a few times by mr. nordstrom, from wanting opposed to be permanent in the area, did you get the sense that it was an embarrassment as well? got that sense. >> that was more mr. nordstrom? >> that was specifically theeyed to both me and prior detail. >> anything to add, mr. thompson? >> nothing in this context. >> you have been providing the truth and i appreciated.

i yield back. >> would you mind giving me about 10 seconds back in? >> i will yield to the chairman. >> i will be brief. mr. hicks, colonel wood in the previous hearing with mr. nordstrom testified about trips back-and-forth of these military people like the four who were told not to get on the plane. during our time as deputy chief of mission, did those four during training ever go to benghazi? >> no. >> thank you. beinghank each of you for here all day today and, as mr. nordstrom started out, you let us know clearly this is not about politics but people. thank you for that. that is what it is. to the families, the people back home are standing with you.

we have on believable questions i will submit to you that we will not cover today in terms of asking them but we will submit for you to answer, but their standing with you to get to the truth of this and they will gnaw sit until those questions have been answered. thank you to the chairman for this informative hearing. mr. thompson, you spoke earlier about the deployment of the specialist team and you thought it was important to do that. were there many of the regencies who thought that, other than you, that it was important? fbi and dod specifically. >> it was not just you. outside the state department, the dod and the fbi both felt like it was the appropriate response to make sure that we provide that kind of force? >> people who are a part of the

team could play with us were shocked and amazed0--- who deploy with us were shocked and amazed they were not called to go. whether that was shared by senior members in the institution, i do not know. had a the dod and fbi contradictory response to what the state department's ultimate decision was? >> the state department does not make the decision. the national security council deputy committee issues the deployment. was a stronged from ournversation department representatives that they were convinced it was not the thing to do. arb.t me go back to the everyone talks about how wonderful the process was. i see this as narrowing scope, and complete in its nature.

i don't want to put words in your mouth, but you talked about affixing blame on the middle level or those career employees, not those that a senior local or the political appointments. is that correct? >> that's correct. where the say that is decisions are made, at the senior level? made atinsisted it was the assistant secretary at below which is a variance from what i have personally seen. >> you believe they are made at a much higher level. mr. hicks, you're nodding your head yes. is that correct? >> i believe so. >> the arb in looking to place blame on a career employees of what hehole lot would say the decision makers in terms of assigning blame? >> absolutely. >> both of you agree? let me go a little further, mr.

nordstrom. one last question and then i will yield to the gentleman from your top. as. at this, is it fair that all the blame got assigned to the diplomatic security component? aren't they just one component under the management euro? is that correct? >> it's absolutely correct. i do not believe it's fair. those agresource determinations are made by the deputy and a secretary for management. >> when we start assigning blame, if it was in complete in their analysis celek terms of who was to blame with regards to an agency? >> that's correct. you fix the blame for the three people wonder the undersecretary of management and nothing to him? he either did not know what was going on with his subordinates or he did and did not care. >> will the gentleman yield to the gentleman from south carolina? >> i would be glad to yield to

the gentleman. >> i know i do not have much time, but mr. hicks, i want to set the table for the next round. 12th, 2012, did you receive an e-mail from beth copied victoria, patrick kennedy, and cheryl mills? you are on the distribution list. do you recall receiving that e- mail? >> i'm sorry. which e-mail? i was receiving a few hundred per day. >> that's fair. he said hisd, when government suspected that former gaddafi machine elements carried out the attack, i told him that the group that conducted the attacks, ansar al are related to his longest extremists? >> i do believe i remember that

e-mail. >> thank you, mr. chair. as a veteran of vietnam and iran, and understand that boots on the ground are the closest to the truth in the situation. you know more about what happened in benghazi than any bureaucrat or politician can. being caught between the political dictates of superiors and the chain of command, doing what's necessary to protect our citizens abroad, and understand the risks to have taken by showing up here today as well. thank you for having the courage to testify before us. recount on you to reveal the truth about the failures of this government and to protect the men and women who served in libya and how we can do a better job in the future. mr. thompson, earlier you mentioned that you hang out with some great and honorable groups. force, marines, shallow water sailors? >> all of the above.

i might add, sir, from other agencies of government, also. the fbi, the intelligence community, department of energy, diplomatic security. >> this is part of your special security forces? >> interagency component of the foreign emergency support team. >> highly trained? >> very much so. we are not the operators. we are the facilitators and the people who bring the operation and coordinate all aspects of their response. we are not the ones kicking in the door, as the term is used to this day. >> you share a common defense, if i'm not mistaken -- a common ethos. >> yes. >> always watch your buddy's 6:00, never leave anyone behind. operators5 special

and highly skilled state department staffer available in tripoli but they were not dispatched to aid american under attack in benghazi. why were they not deploy to rescue the americans in benghazi? >> i cannot answer that. i was not on the ground. sure that number is accurate. people toloyed benghazi. with seveneam went members at midnight. the second team left at about 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. that morning. but could not deploy all of our security personnel because we still had about 55 diplomatic personnel in tripoli that were under threat of attack. thank you very much. i yield the rest of my time to the gentleman from south carolina.

ther. hicks, going back to e-mail. justling clear, mr. chairman nothing would thrill me more than to release this e-mail, certainly not classified. we all had access. i had to do is go downstairs in the basement and look through it. i hope my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will call for the state department to release this evidence as they are when they are unhappy with us. against that backdrop, this e- mail was sent on september 12th and i want to read you something from ambassador rice. "first of all, it's important to note there is an fbi investigation that has begun." this is on september 16th. time to bee some completed. i was an average prosecutor, but i did it for a long time. let me ask you this.

are you aware of any crime scene that is improved with time? [laughter] >> i'm not a criminal investigator. >> trust me when i tell you crime scenes do not get better with time. they're not secure. people have access to them. they can walk through and compromise the evidence. would you agree with me that you would want to talk to the witnesses as close to the event as a possibly can? >> seems reasonable. >> you would want to search incidents as close to the time that you could. >> again, seems reasonable. >> ambassador rices saying the investigation has begun but she is also talking about a video and the reality of, and this is the point i want to drive home, is that it was a direct result of what she said that the bureau did not get to benghazi in a timely fashion. is that true or not true?

>> it is my belief. >> you use the word in measurable. it was a measurable in its damage. but-- it was immeasurable. tell me what he meant by that. .> the fbi team was delayed the libyan government could not secure the compound. it was visited by numerous people. one of the items taken from the chris's diary which, through the extraordinary efforts, we were able to retrieve it and return that back to the department. there were other documents published that another journalist managed to acquire while visiting the compound. it made achieving the objective of getting the fbi to benghazi

very, very difficult and the ability of them to achieve their mission more difficult. >> i thank the gentleman. we now go to the gentleman from florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think this is an important hearing and it makes all the difference to me to know whether we did all we could to aid our brethren in harm's way. it is part of the military ethos and our national character. mr. hicks, just to go back to come even though you believe help was needed, there was a special operations unit ordered to stand down, correct? >> yes. >> even though you thought air support was needed, none was sent. >> no air support was sent. >> no gun ships, and a fighter planes. planes wereter mentioned out of aviano. >> and a request for airspace other than the request to the

libyan government, right? >> and that preceded the attack, if i'm not mistaken. >> when the order to stand down was given, who issued the order? we told that the lieutenant colonel told you he was ultimately responsible for issuing the order? >> he did not identify the person. >> you do not know if it was a combat commander or whether it was the secretary of defense for the president? >> i have no idea. >> since this incident has happened, have you been enlightened as to who was ultimately responsible for assuring the standouts? >> the right person to pose the question to his lieutenant colonel gibson. she expressed support for getting military assistance to the people in benghazi? did she say she would request such support from the secretary of defense for the president of the united states? discuss the issue.

at the time, we're focused on trying to find and hopefully rescue ambassador stevens. that was the primary purpose of our discussion. a secondary purpose was to talk about what we read going to do in tripoli in order to enhance security there. you ininformed her that benghazi were in fact under attack? >> she was aware of the attack. we were in phase three. the attack, the first two had already been completed. .here was a lull at the time again, the focus was on finding ambassador stevens and what the tripoli response team was going to do. we had at that time no expectation that there would be subsequent attacks at the annex. >> you viewed it as secure at that point? >> we knew the situation was in

flux. >> when you spoke to the president following the attack on the phone, did he say anything about deploying assets or why they were not deployed? >> i spoke to him on september 17th or 18th. >> i notice several days later, or did he say anything or was it to just commend you on your service? >> just to thank me for service and praising the whole team. >> i appreciate that. i think this has been a good hearing. there are still questions remaining. we need to know who gave the orders to stand down. we need to know why you have been demoted. we need to know why the secretary's chief of staff called the man spoke to you the way she did. >> will the gentleman yield? thehank you, i yield to committee chairman. >> always the right answer. , 2:00 a.m. and the

secretary of state cause you personally -- not a common call. about the cause of the attack? did she ask about the video, anything at all that would have allowed you to mayor to the question of how benghazi came to be attacked as far as you know? partdo recall that being of the conversation. what she was not interested in the cause of the attack and this was the only time you spoke directly to the secretary were you could have told her or not about the cause of the attack? >> yes, that is the only time when i could have, but i had attack reported that the had commenced and twitter feeds was asserting ansar sharia responsible. >> he did not have that discussion with her only because it was assumed since you had already reported that the cause of the attack was essentially as long as the extremists? >> yes. >> i thank the gentleman.

ok, does the gentleman yield back? >> the gentleman yield back. we will not travel bigotry second round starting with mr. jordan. >> thank you. mr. hicks, in my first round, asked about sheryl landon indicated that this was a call that you always take, but frankly do not want to get. she is the counselor to the secretary. she is chief of staff to hillary clinton. knowledge of anyone in the state department, when the chief of staff of the secretary calls, is the s that she is speaking on behalf of the secretary herself? >> not necessarily. >> but it is pretty darn important based on response

earlier? >> absolutely. >> i want to go back to the congressman's visit there. your instructor there was going to be an attorney accompanying mr. chief its -- the congressman who was supposed to be next to you at all times. secretary said no one from the senate, no one is more committed to getting this right. if we intend it to get it right and get to the truth than why this concerted effort to shield the interaction of congressmen from you? shouldn't you be able to have a dialogue without a babysitter from the state department, somewhere near their monitoring -- always there monitoring about what happened on their visit? >> i should be able to have a

discussion with the congressman if he so wants. >> in my first round, this was the first and only time this had happened for someone from the state department company a congressional visit and you were instructed specifically by the state department, "do not talk to congressman chaffetz or anyone from the delegation without this lawyer being present." >> correct. >> out of the one time you did have time to interact with mr. chaffetz when the lawyer was not present, you got a phone call? >> correct. >> in the phone call, what did she say? on theasked for a report visit, which i provided. the town of the report, the tone of her voice -- the tone of the report was unhappy, as i recall it, but i faithfully reported

exactly how the visit transpired. i described the contents of the briefing -- can i i introduce you -- interrupt you? >> i recall a phone call afterwards. i was pulled out of the briefing, but i do not recall that that was a time when i spoke to the counselor. i actually can remember. then close proximity to time you had a briefing, the onetime your apart from the state department minder coming received from col? >> yes. call? received a phone i want to stress that this is the equivalent of trauma manual when he is chief of staff.

when he calls, you take that call. you understand it's important and you understand he represents the white house. when cheryl mills calls, you and everyone in the state department understands this is the person right next to secretary clinton. the fact that we had, for the first time in mr. hicks's 22 years of serving his country someone accompanying a congressman on a visit after we lost four american lives and the individual has to be in every single meeting, no personal interaction discussing what's going on, it's completely unprecedented. >> will the gentleman yield? i would be happy to yield. >> you and i have known each other to the middle east for a number of years. in all my years of traveling in the middle east come anytime i was head of a congressional delegation, i had a one-on-one with the ambassador, often in an

automobile going to see the head of state or somewhere else. over the years when you watched a great ambassadors, have you ever failed to see the head of a delegation coming to get a one- on-one? isn't that part of the ceremony of that relationship and how you treat the head of a congressional delegation? not just an exception, but isn't it always a one-on-one meeting at some point during a leadership meeting? >> in every detail i have been involved in, it has been standard. a political appointee of the secretary of state, her right hand person, was telling you to breached protocol. >> the two lawyers did. conversation with her happened after. >> it was in fact people sent by the state department to breached protocol and not provide anything, even if requested by close personal emissary, mr.

chaffetz, not to talk to him privately even if he asked? >> that's right. >> we now go to the ranking member, mr. cummings. listening to your testimony. during an interview with the committee, you were asked point blank, closer to the time that this happened, whether anyone in the department instructed you to withhold and permission from mr. chaffetz. it asked, "did you receive any direction that mr. chaffetz should not be given them permission from washington? washington?' and you said you did not. this is a worse one testimony. abbas looking at the testimony. -- this is your swan testimony and i and just looking at it.

>> i recall that i was instructed not to allow personal .nterviews >> are not trying to twist you up. >> i understand, but i recall also stating that i was not to allow personal interviews between congressman chaffetz, me.rso, acting dsm, or >> riddle to make sure the state department officials are present. -- you were told to make sure they were present. >> correct. >> they told me not to be isolated with congressman chaffetz. is that correct? they did not tell you not to say anything, but do not be isolated. >> they said not to have a personal interview with him. >> by yourself. i'm just trying to be clear, that's all. >> i understand.

you said four military personnel were told not to board the plane. you do not know where the call came from. that's what you said a few minutes ago. know that it came from the special operations command? >> i knew it came from special operations command africa. i did not know who. >> i gotcha. i just wanted to clear that up. the accountability review board, led by thomas pickering, investigating the attacks in thousands ofiewing pages of documents, they issued a very thorough report in december of 2012 putting forth

the results of its review. did you meet with the arbs as part of that investigation? >> i had an interview with them for about to go hours. it is my understanding that a cable went out to every employee at the state department informing them how to contact them if they wanted to bring information forward. did you receive that notice? >> i did. >> did you contact them and request to meet with them? >> i did. >> did you end up meeting with him as part of their review? >> i did not. >> did anyone try to stop you? >> no. >> earlier this week, the congressman claimed the report was incomplete because they never interview to secretary clinton, according to ambassador pickering. ,hey met with secretary clinton

and during that time, they had the opportunity to discuss the report with her and answer any questions. they have put out a joint statement. >> i think that clearly says they did not interview her. they just talked about the report and could have but didn't ask her. is that right? >> i am just trying to get the facts. that is even more reason why we need to have pickering here. i am glad you agree to do that. i want to finish this question. i imagine pickering and admiral mullen have put out a joint statement that based on the thorough investigation, they assigned responsibility where they thought it lay and that was not on secretary clinton. we had unfettered access to

everything, including all the documentation we need it. our more -- our marching orders were to get to the bottom of what happened and that is what we did. you said, wel, as want to get a complete picture and we will hopefully be getting that complete picture very soon so that we can get to the point we want to, which is the reform so that these kinds of things are prevented from happening again. thank you. >> we now go to the gentleman from utah. >> thank you. i would say to the ranking member, who i have the utmost respect for, i totally concur with you. just like the arb,, we should have unfettered access to all the witnesses and all the documents. we should stand up for allelves and demand that the unclassified documents be released so we can look at them at the same time. >> i agree.

i yield back. >> thank you. tomr. nordstrom, it is clear me from the october hearing that there were a number of recommendations that you wanted to see done on the ground. ,t any time during your service did you ever get to everything wanted? where the wreck -- recommendations, were you able to implement those recommendations? >> very few of them. to sayhicks, is it fair the people on the ground trying to make the security decision, that they were not able to get the resources, not able to fortify the facility? they did not have the personal requested. is that fair to say? >> yes. it is fair to say. when i saw secretary clinton four and a half months after the attack in benghazi testify

before the congress that she didn't make the security decision, you made the decision, you are the regional security officer on the ground, you are the chief security person, you are the one that made the security decision. true or false? from thesponse i got regional director when i raised the issue that we were short of our standards for security was that my "tone" was not helpful. >> true or false? the decisions on the ground in libya were made by you. >> i would have liked to have thought, but apparently no. >> mr. hicks, when you saw that, did you have a reaction to it? what is your personal opinion? i was there, i was very , attrated by the situation times, even frightened by the threats, scenario we were

looking at relative to the resources we had to try to mitigate that threat scenario. >> on both sides of the aisle, i find it stunning that four and a half months after the attack secretary clinton still has the gall to say, it wasn't us, it was them. i take full responsibility, but i am not going to hold anybody accountable, but it was them that made the decision. that was not the case. >> mr. nordstrom, you testified 200 security instances prior to the attack. >> correct. asked foreatedly additional security personnel and it was tonight. >> correct. >> it was reduced. >> correct. >> four and a half months after it happened, the secretary of state says, you were

responsible for the security situation in libya. that is what we have. that is exactly what we have. you repeatedly asked. they said, we can't do it. we will take some of them away. they made that decision in washington. the hearing ended in not sober. the only caring we had before the election. the hearing ended with you referring to the folks in washington, your superiors, who would not give you what you needed. you referred to them as the telethon. . is that correct? >> yes. taliban. is that correct? >> yes. i have had a lot of questions about that metaphor. i yield back. >> mr. chairman, one of the things i see in the accountability review board, page 37, i just fine -- first of all, i want to emphasize, the staff showed absolute dedication

and teamwork in mobilizing to respond to the crisis. it goes on their naming you specifically for your work. i can see it in your eyes and the others. god bless you for the work you did. the i have a problem with. ,t says, the third sentence the board found no evidence of undue delays or decision-making or denial of support from washington or the military combatant commanders. that is not true. the next sentence is the most troubling. the safe evacuation of all u.s. government personnel from benghazi. 12 hours after the initial attack. that is not true. there are four people that were not safely evacuated. and at the very beginning, it " those who cannot

remember the past are condemned to repeat it." we cannot allow the arb to say that everyone was safely evacuated, because they weren't. there was a lot of heroism. >> we now go to the gentlelday from new york. >> thank you and i agree completely that there should be equal exchange of information, that we should have access to all information. the democratic minority was denied access to a witness. the only way we knew anything about what mr. thompson was going to say was what we read in the press. there should be equal access to witnesses and there should be equal access to information. >> with a gentlelday yield? >> on your time. >> hold the clock. don'tde an allegation i understand. we didn't have a transcribed interview with two out of the three witnesses. mr. thompson was not available. mr. nordstrom was a previous witness and we felt it was

sufficient information about what he felt. mr. hicks, i think he went through five hours on a bipartisan basis. we forwarded their statements. we participated not at all in preparation. we ordered them to the minority as we got them. i am a little bit concerned only fairat there is nothing about partisan politics, but i believe we fully complied deliberately with the spirit of the rules all along. i would hope the gentlelday would appreciate that. -- gentlelady would appreciate that. with mr.f met thompson. our staff was not allowed. >> this is not true. >> you didn't meet with him? we have had some meetings.

we have not prohibited in any way. not our witness. you are stopping the clock. we need to clear this up. i don't think there's anything to clear up. >> we want to protect whistleblowers. that is very important to us. we have not gotten a syllable -- you have had conversations with mr. thompson. we never had a conversation with ms. thompson. you know that is not fair. all i am saying to you is that we have a witness that came in today. you had an opportunity to interview. >> we never had that opportunity. one quick question. i am asking the witnesses, mr. thompson, is it your decision, did any of my people ever tell you to not talk to the minority?

>> i am not accusing you of that. bikes have we ever suggested you not talk to the minority or their people? >> gnome. -- >> no. no. >> the gentle lady may continue. >> we did request to meet with mr. thompson and through lawyers, he said no. he did speak to the republican staff. theuld like to go back to other questioning about cheryl 'phone call. in reading transcripts, you told our investigators you did not seem -- she did not seem happy when she heard that no other official was in the classified briefing. is that true? >> she was unhappy that the with theat came congressman was not included in that meeting. >> was she unhappy that no

other state official was included? state department official. >> you also said she never criticized you and according to your interview transcript, you said she never gave you any direct criticism. do you stand by that today? >> the statement was clearly no direct criticism, but the tone of the conversation, and this is part of the department of state culture, the fact that she called me and the tone of her voice, and we are trained to gauge tone and nuance and language, indicated to me very strongly she was unhappy. is limited. going to a diplomatic post in benghazi, as i understand it, the british ambassador's convoy was attacked. killed.man was they decided to pull out of benghazi. is that correct? >> i don't believe anyone was killed. i believe we saved the life of

one of those people. i would refer to eric -- >> my question is, did the british ambassador close the post in benghazi and leave? >> he did. >> he did. >> claiming my time, i would yield of some and he wants me to yield, but i wanted to ask, when we continued to stay there, do you think that was a wise decision for us to continue to stay in benghazi after the english had closed their post and lefty echo >> absolutely. >> why was it important for us to stay in benghazi? >> we needed to stay there as age symbolic gesture to a people that we saved during the revolution. 's forces were on the doorstep of benghazi right before the nato bombing commenced. as a gesture, as i said, chris

went there as a gesture to support the dream of the people of benghazi to have a democracy. that shared your position staying there was incredibly -- >> he also understood from the secretary herself that benghazi was important to us and we needed to make it to be a permanent constituent post. >> i agree with my good friend on the other side of the aisle that it was a long time before the fbi got on the ground. as i understand it from a report they gave us, they got them right away. september 16, the government couldd them so the team travel to libya. the flight clearance was granted in the fbi arrived in tripoli on september 18.

there was the security situation on the ground. >> the libyan government did not want any of our personnel to go to benghazi because of the security situation there. the libyan government felt it was secure enough for them to go there. is that a fair statement? >> we strung together a series .f approvals it went with the fbi and special forces troops. >> thank you. the gentlelday's friend. am trying to reconcile how

benghazi was not safe enough for the federal bureau of investigation to go, but it was facilitygh to leave a diplomats to stay in. it is too dangerous for the bureau. it is just fine for diplomats. the best evidence rule, the best evidence of what you said, this is what you said. here it is. those instructions were to arrange the visit in such a way that represented the staff would not have the opportunity and davidew myself mcfarland alone. that is what you said. in the deposition. there shouldn't be ambiguity about who said what when.

that is your testimony. weaved like to try to this tapestry together. this is the last opportunity i have today to talk to you. i understand your testimony and i want to be clear about it. if i mischaracterize anything, correct me. if i understand your testimony, in part, the investor was interested in going to benghazi because of the interests secretary clinton had. is that fair? >> that is fair. >> mr. nordstrom, same thing to you. i thought i understood your testimony to be that secretary clinton alone was able to approve facilities that were below specs. >> that is correct, some of the specs. there are two static or he said -- two categories. in this case, both applied because we did not >> we are able to show that he went to

benghazi because thing god is a but still open because it was below specs because of secretary clinton and now to my third point, to complete -- that he went to benghazi because bank bank ozzie be -- .enghazi was open i have heard all afternoon about denying access to documents and they do not want to deny the public or the media access. i know they will call on the state department to release this e-mail, which the should -- which cheryl mills was copied on, which undercuts susan rice 's talking points. cheryl mills was copied on that e-mail. >> if i could add, cheryl mills is the person that led our

preparation for our october testimony. i had never met her before, but that was explained to me afterward. also inently, she was a visit to libya, if i understood that correctly. i find it's dubbed -- stunning. he is one of the more decent human beings i have ever met. let me say this in conclusion. you have made a compelling case it is important to tell other countries the truth. you made a compelling case, the decision not to tell the truth on sunday morning talk shows, adversely impacted our ability to get to benghazi. you made a compelling case. all three of you have made a compelling case today on why it is important for government to

tell the truth to its own citizens. you made the case that we have to tell the truth to other countries and you made the case on why you have to tell the truth to your own simmons -- citizens. if anyone wants to know what difference it makes, anyone wants to ask what difference does it make, it always matters, whether or not you can trust your government. will findilies, we out what happened in benghazi and i don't give a damn whose career is impacted. winding down. i want to ask each of you, you are whistleblowers. you are the kind of people that give us information we wouldn't otherwise have. you areelieve what doing today is what we need to keep doing? do we need other whistleblowers to come forward, other witnesses who know what we don't

currently know? i am not asking you if this was a great process or if you enjoyed it, but was it worth while in your opinion as people who have gone through this process? >> yes, mr. chairman. >> mr. hicks? >> yes, i do. >> mr. nordstrom? >> absolutely. >> i hope you continue to feel that way. >> i want to follow up on a conversation we had earlier. , 2012.le of march 28 you drafted that requesting additional personnel for the embassy and tripoli because you were very much short and time was expiring. you knew you were not going to have enough people. your intention and assumption was the executive leadership would see that cable or at least be briefed on that cable and the request after that security. there has been a lot of

discussion about the official response that came back on april 19. reflected thenk opinion when that cable came back to you? when it came back to you, who was the assumption responding to you? >> normally someone would tell me who it is or they would indicate who the point of contact was. that is still unknown to me. i assume it was coming from ds. as a testified before, so many decisions seem to be at ambassador kennedy's level or higher. that was cleared by officials here it >> you are assuming this is the inter-secretary or up, someone who had personal knowledge of that cable that came back. it is an established fact that there is clear video of the attackers. dfv i has done an extensive investigation. we are -- were any of you aware of anyone who has been held to account for the murders that

happened in libya? anyone detained, arrested, captured? are you aware of anything that has happened to hold them to account? >> neither the perpetrators nor the persons that made decisions. the four people named in the arb are on administrative leave. one of them is trying to come back and go to nato, which is shocking to me. >> no one is aware of anyone who has been held to account in any way for the murder of four americans? >> not that i'm aware of. >> in 1998, we discussed frequently, there was a bombing in tanzania. there was the arb at the end of that as well. let me read you the three findings at the end of that arb done in 1999. the state department of washington did not assess the threats or take notes of the clear signs escalating threats. forfacility was inadequate

the most modest of attacks. there was a lack of preparation and warning systems at the facility. that could have have been written a month ago. we have discussed this. the one thing we have to do is learn the lesson. in 1998, this same thing occurred, and we have not learned the lesson. what we know of today, and the realities that have come out, and through all you contributed to the conversation, and it is invaluable, is that we did not do the most basic minimum security that was required by the state department sanders set after the bombing in nairobi, kenya, and in 10 .innia -- tanzania there were cameras that were in because a benghazi technical person had never been sent to install those. there could have been additional warning signs but they had not been installed. we know the tripoli facility was even at a greater risk of van benghazi -- than banghazi.

.hysical security, staffing door kickers in such. the people could provide security. the minimum level was not provided. my understanding is it reached such a point of vulnerability that you approached and asked for the diplomats to be trained in how to handle a gun because there was such a fear of the people on the ground because you were so exposed. is that true? >> true. >> he have got to learn the lessons of the past. this happened in 1998. we allowed it to happen again. the state department has to put into practice their own standard and put into place the things we know to be right. we cannot allow a place listed as critical at high risk to our personnel to be ignored. there is any one thing that we can do and anyone way to be able to honor those that have

fallen, it is that we do learn the lesson and we protect our diplomats with what is required. yield back. >> we now go to the gentleman from florida. mr. hicks, did you have something to say? >> i wanted to make a point of clarification about the conversation with the ranking member. there is no inherent contradiction between denying or avoiding a private interview heh someone and making sure has information available. i want to be clear on that. >> thank you. i don't think i have ever read so much testimony, but what you provided last night i thought was particularly informative. page seven, you talk about the forng level assigned threat categories for our

various posts. there are four of them, critical, high, medium, and low. that -- wherests ,e had security concerns overseas diplomatic posts, at the time of benghazi. there were 14 posts are rated as either high or critical, a huge number. not a huge -- number. two of them were tripoli and benghazi. it is not like they had this incredible array of posts that were on this high alert. is that correct? >> that is my understanding. a small amount were high. >> finally, again, i have not read the classified. i read the unclassified version. it is pointed out later in the report where it looks like they

tried to cook this to put the blame on the lower level, there is a certain plateau, then everybody below gets the blame. on page four, when i had my time before, i said embassy tripoli, this is from the report, did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with washington for increased security for special mission benghazi. we have heard your predecessor pleaded for additional help. you pleaded for it. it is documented. you didn't get it. you actually got a reduction. is that correct? >> yes. drastic reduction. >> it was not like this was all over the place. for the arb, you put in here to ignore the role of senior department leadership played before, during, and after the september 11 attacks sends a clear message to all state department employees. it looks like they are

whitewashing the folks at the higher pay grade and levels and you all are taking the blame. is that a fair assessment? >> i think the basic message is that whether or not you are sitting out in a post requesting resources, preparing for testimony before this committee, or standing on a building surrounded by an armed mob attacking you, the message is the same, you are on your own. >> i share with mr. nordstrom had to say. >> i still can't believe that you were never interviewed and you had one of the most strategic positions by the arb. that is true? >> i will let you use strategic, sir. it is a tool that should remain on the menu of options. that is my basic point. it was early taken off the menu. >> it is a very sad commentary. yield back.

we have heardt here today clearly is that in rso's, deputy chief admissions, chief admissions, need to put everything in cable. in the future, when you know there is a security problem and you are being told your application would not be helpful, it would not be wanted, or people say, be patient, or don't put it in cable, the answer is, the next arb will probably whitewash the same as this one on october 10, ranking member and i and many others sat through a hearing in which it was made very clear that message after message after message, including the actual open source information about the attacks that occurred on the other diplomatic missions and saying, if that is not loudly, they blew a hole in our wall, when are you going to give us the security we need, that at leastid

under secretary kennedy's level not in any way curable by technology known to amplify sound, so with that, this hearing is closed, but this investigation is not over. issa said he will hold another benghazi hearing. the former joint chiefs of staff chairman mike mullen and ambassador thomas pickering. their report said the state department said officials in libya were equipped to deal with the attack and found new evidence of misconduct. >> on the next "washington journal," representative jackie speier of california on sexual assaults in the military. paul gosarssman talks about the benghazi attack.

liveington journal" is every morning starting at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> thursday, the house homeland security committee holds a thees of hearings about boston marathon bombings. the investigation will look at law enforcement action and how the federal, state, and local agencies worked together before and after the attacks. live coverage at 9 a.m. eastern on c-span3. the gangsters in general whose main business was to supply a legal alcohol, became figures in the 1920. they were hated and feared by a lot of americans. they were very violent, of course. they organize with other gangs and gangsters. blood ran in the streets of chicago, detroit, new york, philadelphia, pittsburgh, other major cities across the east and midwest.

26 years old,nly he headed a business that generated $16 million annually, which is equivalent to about $500 million today. his payroll included no less than 1000 gunmen who killed at least 250 competitors of his in chicago. he was a complicated fellow, a family man, with children, faithful to his wife, at least that is what most people heard and believed, he hosted annual block parties where he lived in chicago, he was a consumer 11 carat diamond rings, he liked to buy and consume a rich wine and excellent food, not just excellent italian food excellent french food as well, and he also seemed like a good man in the community, as we would say now. >> the georgetown university kasin revisitsel

history. history tv.erican >> this home was a gift that 13 businessmen purchased to give to the grant family in appreciation for his service during the war. she mentions in her memoirs coming up the hill and being presented in this lovely villa that she said was furnished everything good taste could offer. we are now in the parlor, which was the entertaining part of the home. we all know that julia was an avid entertainer. loved it. the family spent quite a bit of time here also. mrs. grant and their daughter ellen laid the p&l. you can imagine the family sitting here, the general in his favorite chair, the boys is sitting and listening to their sister and their mother play some songs for them. the de soto hotel was downtown. the day after the election,

grant and julia opened up their home in the parlor here for filee, townsfolk, to through an congratulate both of them on his election and the next step of their lives. this is called a lap book. it has mrs. u.s. grant on it. , pens,bably kept papers her correspondence in here for when she was either writing letters or maybe receiving them. over on the dresser, we have a bible that was given to mrs. grant by the methodist at this couple church in 1888. this is the dressing room, the most personal space in the house relating to julia grant. this is the room she would come in to get ready in the mornings, get ready in the evenings, ready to bed, and maybe just kind of get a little solitude from everybody in the house. we have a lot of personal things in here that long to mrs. grant. we have for sewing kits that you probably would have used to mend some socks for the kids or the general, so a button on, we have a couple pairs of her fill

size for shoes that she wore, and some purses that she would have used if she was going out on the town visiting on a sunday afternoon. this is where he came back after he was a military hero and started his military career here, basically. this is where he was living when .e was elected this was home to them right before that. julia conversation on grant is available on our website, c-span.org/firstladies. people don't know that cigarettes are actually the main way we are exposed to radioactive isotopes. theverage smoker will get equivalent of hundreds of chest x-rays per year just from their smoking. that is mainly from the pesticide, rather, the fertilizers that were put on tobacco. super phosphates are put around the plant.

it does contain uranium. that decays to lead. the lead to polonium. the same poison that killed the russian spy in london a few years ago is present in cigarette smoke. that was already discovered in the 1960s. the most easily preventable cause of death in the modern world, the cause that is deathsible for 440,000 in the united states every year and is completely preventable, but we allow it. robert proctor on tobacco's history and the continuing dangers of smoking, sunday night at 10:00 eastern, part of book tv this weekend on c-span two. -- c-span2. senator graham's allegations that former secretary of state clinton mishandled the situation in benghazi, libya. they also took questions on the talking points used by un

ambassador susan rice after the attacks. here is what he had to say. >> in advance of today's hearing on benghazi, senator lindsey graham said, i think the dam is about to break on den -- on benghazi. we will find people asleep at the switch, including hillary killington -- hillary clinton. what do you say about that? i say a couple of things. this administration has made extraordinary efforts to work with five different congressional committees investigating what happened before, during, and after the benghazi attacks, including over the past eight months, testifying in 10 congressional hearings, holding 20 staff briefings, and providing over 25,000 pages of documents. another leading senate republican said he feels he knows what happened in benghazi and is barely satisfied. much of what the witnesses were expected to raise in the

hearings today has already been addressed both in hearings and in the accountability review board report. a subject that has, from its beginning, been subject to attempts to politicize it. what happened in benghazi was a tragedy. those who are responsible for the death of four americans should be found and brought to justice. we must do everything we need to do to ensure that this kind of attack cannot happen again. up of theng accountability review board by then secretary clinton, with the full support of the president, demonstrates the seriousness with which she took this issue. that board, that review board, issued a report that was

unsparing and highly critical in some areas. it was led by highly respected, nonpartisan experts in the field of national security. admiral mullen and ambassador pickering. that report contained within it a series of recommendations. every single one of which has been acted on or is being acted on by the state department. that demonstrates the seriousness with which we took the true issue here. it also, given the remarkable level of cooperation we have demonstrated with congressional committees thus far, demonstrates again that we are at a place that there are attempts to politicize this one that should not be the case. >> why do you think they're going after hillary clinton? >> i am not sure they are. i will note that in a report this was highly

partisan. it included a main allegation within it that was described by a fact checker this way. showing no evidence clinton had anything to do with this case anymore than she personally approved the cable cable on proper e-mail etiquette. the odds are long that she never saw this memo, giving us confidence that this qualifies as a -- is confident hillary acted appropriately through this process. >> we are. point you told the report they put out. theuld point you to what , eachads of that board highly praised by both sides of the aisle for their long, distinguished careers, put out

in a statement this week. from the beginning of the process, we had unfettered access to everyone and everything, including all the documentation we needed. our marching hours -- orders were to get to the bottom of what happened and that is what we did. this is an unsparing report done by career professionals. it contained within it serious recommendations, found shortcomings that needed to be corrected, and the state department acted immediately on that. >> something you said on november 28, you said the talking points that were prepared for ambassador rice and were writtenation up by the intelligence community that there was no change that was asked for by the white house or by the state house except for a single word. now that the weekly standard

has obtained a three revisions, they show substantial changes that were done and asked for specifically by the state department. were you incorrect when you said -- >> i was not. the intelligence community, the cia drafted these talking points and redrafted them. in a always the case process like this. the only edits made by anyone at the white house were stylistic and non-substantive. they corrected the description , the facilityg and benghazi, and the like. has beeny, this all discussed and reviewed and provided an enormous level of detail by the administration to congressional investigators and the attempt to politicize the talking points is part of an to chase after what is

the substance here. diplomatic facility was tasked. four americans were killed. the president has been committed to bringing to justice those responsible and committed to ensuring we take every step we can to protect our diplomats in the future and to make sure this kind of events doesn't happen again. you know from within the hours of the attack, beginning with a press release that was much maligned by members of his own party, the republican nominee for president tried to politico -- politicize this and that has been the case ever since. it continues to this day. you have seen levels of cooperation here that are rather extraordinary. 25,000 pages of documents. 10 congressional hearings. nothing that we expect to hear today contradicts anything that has already been discussed and revealed, assessed by the

accountability review board. if it is the position of critics that that rib -- review board and its chairs are not being faithful to the facts and the truth, you know, i think they have to discuss that with the chairs of the board. the fact is that this has been looked at exhaustively. >> specifically asking about what you said and what you just said now, stylistic changes, these changes look much more than stylistic. there are references to the security concerns expressed on september 10, the day before the attack. being taken out. there are references to al qaeda being taken out. >> what remains true is the intelligence community drafted and redrafted these points. that is what the deputy director of the cia has said. the fact that there is input from others doesn't change the fact that the cia or the intelligence community drafts

these consistent with what they know. they provide information to members of congress as well as members of the administration so they can speak publicly about it. if you look substantively at the information provided in the talking points about what happened in benghazi, i think that reflects everything he said. has to be a knowledge that those talking points that ambassador rice went out and used on those sunday shows and that i used when i discussed it made clear that we believe extremists were involved in the attack and that we knew that more information would come to light and our understanding of affectedened would be as that information became available. in the days following, more information was provided by us because we are committed to making sure we found out what happened, who is responsible, and make sure we could take

steps to prevent it from happening again. >> you believe a video sparked the attack echo >> no, i think that has been adjudicated and litigated many times. the talkingk at points, the one references the protest. it turned out not to be the case. that on thend you friday before the sunday had a violente demonstrations going on at embassy facilities around the world. we had a black flag raised at one of our embassies. walls ateaches of another. we had a great deal of concern as a result of the protests surrounding these about the safety and security of diplomatic personnel around the region and the world. it is entirely appropriate that

there was concern about that. i think it is understandable there was some possibility of a connection between the demonstrations we were seeing in cairo and what took place in benghazi. if you look at what was said -- let's review the fact. here is what ambassador rice said that sunday. it is clear that there were a extremist elements that joined and escalated the violence, whether they were al qaeda affiliates, whether they were libyan-based extremists, or al qaeda itself, is one of the things we will have to determine. that is a simple statement of the fact we knew when we knew them. that is on the sunday about which so much has been discussed and misrepresented. >> now, the house oversight committee hearing on the attack on the consulate in benghazi. this from mark

thompson, acting deputy assistant secretary in the counterterrorism bureau and gregory hicks, former deputy chief of staff mission in libya. mr. hicks said he was demoted after questioning statements made by un ambassador susan rice. we are seeing the chairman of issa,mmittee, darrell greeting witnesses. we will hear him give his opening statement, along with a statement from representative of elijah cummings, the top democrat on the committee.

>> the hearing will come to order. the oversight committee exists to secure two fundamental principles, first, americans have a right to know that the money washington takes from them is well spent. second, americans deserve an efficient government that works for them. our duty on the oversight and government reform committee is to protect these rights. our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers because they have their right to know what they get from their government. our obligation is to work tirelessly with citizen watchdogs and whistle-blowers to deliver the fax to the american

people and bring genuine reform on the federal bureaucracy. september 11, 2012, four americans were murdered by terrorists. it was the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on new york and washington. recognizing that the witnesses before us are actual experts on what really happened before, during, and after the benghazi attacks, i will not recount those events or decisions. these witnesses deserve to be heard on the benghazi attacks, the flaws in the accountability review board's methodology in methodology, process, and conclusion. before i introduced the witnesses and explain some of our efforts to learn more about what happened in benghazi, can we have the doors closed, please?

i want to take a moment to reflect on and recognize the brave americans who lost their lives in that attack that day. i also want to note that there are friends and immediate family of those killed or injured who j.re with us today. christopher stephens, u.s. ambassador to libya, sean patrick smith, information management specialist. tyrone woods, a security specialist, former navy seal. glenn doherty.security specialist and former navy seal. our goal in this investigation

is to get answers because their families deserve answers. they were promised answers out-- at the highest level when their bodies came home. the president was there, the vice president, the secretary of defense, and the secretary of state were there. we want to make certain those promises are kept on behalf of those individuals. we also want to make certain that our government learns the proper lessons from this tragedy so that it never happens again and so the right people are held want those.i watching this proceeding to know that we have made extensive efforts to engage the administration and to see and hear their facts. the administration however has not been cooperative. unfortunately, our minority has mostly sat silent as we have

made these requests. some examples. on february 22nd, this committee wrote to ambassador pickering and admiral momullen who, as-- admiral mullen, who, as required by law, were appointed by secretary clinton and co-chair of the accountability review board investigation, we asked them to testify in our minority said nothing. when we asked ambassador pickering and admiral mullen to speak with us and our committee informally, they again refused and again there was silence by the minority. when five house committee chairman wrote the white house and requested relevant documents about the benghazi attacks, we were refused. the committee's minority did not join in a similar call for transparency, and i wish they had. on april 29th, this committee asked the state department to

make nine current and former officials with relevant information available for this hearing, or a separate transcribed interview. the state department did not even respond. to date, the minority has not made a similar request. mr. cummings, i would like nothing more than have you work with me on this investigation. because we have worked on other areas together, i still hold out hope that one day he will stand with me as this administration does not cooperate. when they ignore our inquiries and when that day comes, together, we will be far more effective. and now, for witnesses. mr. mark thompson is the acting assistant secretary in the state department euro of counterterrorism. welcome. mr. gregory hicks, a 22-year

veteran foreign service officer and the former deputy chief of mission for the u.s. embassy in libya. after embassador stevens was murdered, he became the active active chief of mission. he was in fact in libya, the highest ranking officer, if you will, america's representative in libya. mr. erik nordstrom is the former regional security officer in libya. he is perhaps the foremost and most knowledgeable person about security requests that were made and denied to the u.s. diplomatic mission in libya and in benghazi, ultimately in benghazi. mr. cummings, we will have, from time to time, our disagreements. i know that for all the members

of this committee, we understand that these disagreements must be kept on this side of the dais. these brave witnesses deserve this committee's called to testify. these brave whistleblowers are what make this committee's work work. we are the committee that led for new whistle blower protections signed by this president and the public has a right to hear their accounts and we, more than any other committee, must respect whistle- blowers and work on a bipartisan basis always to protect them. with that, i recognize the ranking member for his opening statements. >> mr. chairman, i want to thank you for calling this hearing. i want to be clear. i have said it over and over again. there is no member of this

congress, be they republican or democrat, who fails to uphold the right of whistle-blowers to come forward. and i think it is sad when that accusation is made against any member of congress.

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there is a classified version also. this is available online. we have a responsibility under law to review these situations, to go to people who actually had first-hand knowledge. mr. thompson, you have a very important position. >> correct. >> did you participate? were you interviewed by the -- you were not interviewed? ok. you were on the job during this. >> i was at my desk that night until 2:00 in the morning. >> you were not allowed to

convey information? >> on the 17, i had a request to be on the board. >> have you ever been interviewed? >> i have not. your one of the primary players, but if the board failed to interview you. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> is mr. thompson an important player in this? >> i would say yes. certainly in the aftermath of the attack. were you interviewed by the board? >> i was interviewed by the board. the interview took about two

hours, and it was incomplete in my mind. a few days later, i had a separate meeting of the executive secretary. you did have a follow-up meeting. >> to amplify some issues that had been discussed at the meeting. >> mr. norstrom, did you participate? >> i did. on two occasions. i shared with them -- >> the same. i thought it was thorough and professional. their reports is comprehensive. they stop short interviewing people that i personally know were involved in key decisions that led to how those events unfolded. , specifically how those buildings were staffed and sure and constructed.

those were critical. >> in the unclassified version, they said that security in benghazi was now recognized enablement it as a shared responsibility of the bureau's in washington charge with stone type -- stovepipe decisions on security. that part is interesting. the embassy of tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with washington for increased security for special missions. would you agree with that? >> if i could speak to that, i would disagree with a collaborative process. i'm not sure of the term used. on a number of occasions, i testified in october, i raise issues. the ambassador raise issues.

the reports on decisions of the compound and the benghazi compound were decided in washington. those decisions were not cleared with us or shared with us. that doesn't seem a collaborative process. >> i want up time for mr. nixon tell us about his -- >> i monitored the discussions that eric has testified about from my arabic language students. when i arrived in tripoli, i had the understanding that these decisions had been settled and that we were not to relitigate them. in terms of the number of personnel at post.

i began a process to attempt to relitigate them in mid-august greeted we held a meeting to discuss the matter. we were unable to return to that issue before 9/11 occurred. >> thank you. we now recognize the gentleman from massachusetts. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank the witnesses for their courageous service and your willingness to come before the committee here. i also want to offer my condolences to ambassador stevens and his family. these were american heroes. they were our very best. i do not want that to be overlooked.

these individuals were regarded as our very best, including the ambassador stevens. without question, his opinion and the respect that his experience and authority in matters in lebanon, libya, not only in tripoli but also in benghazi was unquestioned. it showed in the difference those were given to his decision. the report singled out areas where i thought they were trying to identify where the decisions that were made may have been deficient. they do identify on page 30.

they talk about the bureau of diplomatic security. there appeared to be a real confusion over who ultimately was responsible and empowered to make decisions based on policy and security considerations. they go on further to say that the bureau showed a lack of leadership with respect to benghazi, failing to -- at the same time with attention to late the bureau's front office showed a lack of ownership of security issue. and a tendency to rely totally diplomatic security for the letter. what they point to in the next couple of paragraphs is they thought the result, the special mission to the benghazi extension, was a temporary residential facility, not officially notified to the host

government, even though it was a full-time office facility, resulting in the special mission compound being accepted from office facility standards and accountability understood your embassy construction and counterterrorism. your point exactly. the oversee security policy board three what they are saying is there was an extension made that there was a lowering and expectations of their, that the resources for fiscal security and the personnel assignments needed at that was not given adequate priority. that was let -- let to dip my security make those repairs pre- is that something you see as being to be a weak part in this process. >> i do. as i said, i think that what remains on scene is what made that decision to make this a temporary facility. at one point, i was told by the

undersecretary that the recommendation that we wanted to make, the upgrades, both in trouble he and may cause he would not be made. they said, my understanding they agree to the current compound being set up in occupied as is. the arb in particular, i requested, is anything in writing, i would like a copy the i like a copy. as a month before the attack. i got got no confirmation as to who made those decisions. nor did i get a copy of that.

>> status was done level at that point? another was discussion earlier. -- i know there was discussion earlier. >> my understanding was that the facility, the types of facilities are whether or not personal occupancy of the building, or are you a partial occupancy, or are you in a building which is owned by the host nation. clearly we were the sole occupant. that is the standard. it is very clear to read -- it is very clear. we do not meet any of the standards. >> my time is expired.

>> mr. turner. >> thank you. i want to thank you for being here today without your statements, there is a tremendous amount of information that we didn't know. it is important you are giving us this information. we have the component -- condolences for the family. we have to stand on decisions that we have been able to discuss. mr. x, you told us of colonel gibson. i am fascinated with the standard order to colonel gibson. we want to know who gave colonel gibson the order, and why. i would like to review that order with you and what you experienced that night. you told us there was a transfer that went been provided in the and that you indicated that colonel gibson should go. colonel gibson was told to stand down.

let's start first with the review of what is colonel gibson's team. what were they doing in libya? >> the numbers of the special security teams, special forces to protect embassy tripoli after the return of the establishment of the embassy and 2011. on the first of august, the secretary of defense signed an order changing their status from being security team to a training team. and transferring the authority from the chief of mission to general ham. on august 6, two members of that team were in a carjacking incident as they were driving early in the morning outside of the compound.

they had to use their weapons in order to escape that armed attack on their vehicle. in light of that, the general decided to draw down the team from 14 personnel to for personnel. colonel wood and nine others testified before the committee last october letter believe in the middle of the month. the lieutenant colonel are the remainder of that group. >> the chain of command had been changed and they had been reduced. these are highly trained individuals. they would have been useful in situations. >> particularly given the fact that the personnel and benghazi

were exhausted from a night of fighting against very capable opponents. >> do you know why they were told to stand out? >> i do not know why. >>is there any reason to know why the situation was over? any reason to believe that there was no longer any danger in benghazi? >> there was every reason to believe that our personnel were in danger. >> an article appeared in usa today just this week. as early as last monday, major robert furman said the military account issued after the attack hasn't changed. there was never any kind of stand down order to anybody.

that is a broad statement. what is your reaction? >> i can only again repeat that colonel gibson said he was not to proceed to board the airplane. >> your first experience on the site standing next to colonel gibson on his way on that transport, and being told not to go contradicts what was said on behalf of the pentagon. >> yes. did you ask him that evening if there were resources coming from the military? what was your reaction? >> my reaction was that we are on our own.

we are going to have to try to pull this off with the resources that we have available. where the libyan surprise? >> i do not know. i think they were. >> before we go to mr. connolly, because most people in the audience do not understand chief authority, will you run us through who was under your chief commission authority, and who wasn't. we are talking about military assets. a lot of folks here are hearing two chains of command. >> all civilian personnel in civilian libya were under chief of mission authority. until we know that he was dead. before members of the special forces team were under general hams authority, we had personnel

in country, and i was unclear whether they were on their way are not. >> anyone you had under your authority, they went downrange if you ask them to bring the others were not allowed to. >> yes, sir. >> thank you. you will have your full time. >> thank you for the clarification. was not interviewed by the arb. he certainly was. you can look it up. it is documented. he was interviewed. that evidence was evaluated. it is not true that secretary kennedy was not part of that process. he certainly was. i would ask the chairman so the record so reflect. >> who said he wasn't? >> we heard from the table.

>> mr. thompson, statement of did to you that your bureau was actually delivered laying cap literally kept out of post benghazi developments. are those statements contributed to you accurate? i reported to dan benjamin at the time. >> was he included? >> he was overseas of the time. >> was he kept informed? >> i have no idea. i have read it.

i read to you this charge that we were kept out of the loop is simply untrue. >> i was out of the country on official travel. , i wastime of the attack in frequent contact with the departments. at no time did i feel the deliberations in that should've been a part of. -- view of how much >> if i may, sir, if he was adequately informed and given council on that, then that is his professional -- >> he is the head of the bureau. he was your supervisor and that is his testimony. it contradicts your -- >> i don't pick it is his testimony, sir. >> it is now in the evidentiary record. >> hold the time.

>> certainly. anderhaps you are here perhaps not, he has said he is now a future witnessed so we can give testimony. >> we can clear that up with mr. benjamin here. thank you. mr. hayes, i don't think anyone who could've listened to your minute by minute account of what happened could be anything but moved. the trauma of what you and your colleagues must have gone through especially being in tripoli, not being them to do something about benghazi is terrible. of last yearn may before the tragedy, and i don't remember whether we had a chance to meet or not. we were not allowed to stay in libya overnight. what struck me when i arrived in tripoli was airport security was

provided by a militia, and i traveled a lot in my years in foreign-policy. it goes to the mind of what can go wrong with this. it is a volatile, violent, unstable situation. do you want to talk a little bit about the domestic situation ?n libya as we found it in ae facing instability post revolutionary situation. could you just share with us some insights into what you found in terms of that instability? andhank you, mr. connolly thank you for being my representative. i just want to say that i don't recall saying that anyone other than myself justified to the arb or was a witness before the arb.

i want to be clear about that. the political and security climate in liberty -- libya, it was highly unstable, although after the elections, we thought that political trajectory of the elections in july was heading in the right direction. the president had been selected and they were trying to appoint a new prime minister and moved towards a democratic government. the security scene was very unstable. it has been, i think, will document it. we had assassinations and car bombings in benghazi, but the and notnt was libyan necessarily directed at foreigners. at the same time that we are in the process of building towards in benghazi at permanent post, the british are contemplating returning there

to benghazi. they left after their ambassador survived an assassination attempt in june. in tripoli, we also have instability, car bombings, carjackings, we have islamic militias that begin to attack shrines and a government that is struggling to maintain security and improved security in the country. >> thank you. we are proud of you. i would add my voice to that of mr. cummings. of the house foreign affairs committee. my personal pledge, were ever to be any hint, any retaliation or retribution, your willingness to come forth and tell your version of what happened, this member of congress will intervene on her behalf. >> i thank the gentleman. the gentleman from tennessee. >> thank you for calling this

hearing. there is great interest and concern about what happened in this tragic incident. mr. nordstrom, we have artie heard mr. thompson say that he was never interviewed him a even though he requested to be interviewed. do i understand you greatly to say that you know of other witnesses that had first-hand knowledge who were not interviewed by the board? misunderstood about that. i will tell you, i was a criminal court judge for 7.5 years trying felony criminal cases, i can tell you that it is surprising that anybody with first-hand knowledge wouldn't be interviewed about of this somebody did not want to have a complete report. , what were you told was the reason you were not interviewed? >> i was not given a reason,

sir. >> you were not given a reason. mr. hicks, do you feel that the report lets any individual or bureaucracy off the hook? >> yes, sir. i think that in our system of government, the decision-making authority is at the level of presidential appointed, senate confirmed david -- individuals. i said the level higher. now, the reporting coming out of the embassy of tripoli on conditions there, particularly the fact that we had to provide a daily report of two was in country under-secretary kennedy and the fact that he made the decision as to who came to tripoli at benghazi or who didn't, that budgets were --

came to his table and that security reports also came to his table would suggest that there is a possibility there. mr. thompson, let me ask you this. another thing i find surprising is that the security -- did the security people not security the date of 9/11 -- we artie heard somebody say that this mission was considered to be a high threat or high-risk mission. did they not realize that 9/11 is a high-security type date and they should be repaired for terrorist activities on that date in particular? >> certainly. when i hear security, i think of greg nordstrom, so i won't go down the security trail too far. certainly on the anniversary of 9/11, since 2001, we have all

had our antenna up, so to speak, and then forward leaning if not to mentally on that particular day, yes. report basically puts primary blame for the situation on the bureau of the book that -- diplomatic security. i would like to ask any of you you have a comment about that? do you think that is fair? >> this might also address congressman connolly's question. my concern with the report is under-secretary kennedy was or was not interviewed. that is part of the confidentiality of it. i do not know. there has been a lot of discussion of how many people were supposed to be there or not suppose to be there. those things are not driven by regulations in law. that was subjective opinion.

that was quite a bit of my testimony in october. i go back to who authorized embassy employees, u.s. government employees to go into facilities that did not meet legal requirements? i don't know who made the decision. the reason why is because as the ambassador said, he has decided to fix this possibility on the assistant secretary level and below. how i see that is, that is fine. it is an accountability of mid- level office review board and the message to my colleagues is that if you're above a certain level, the matter what your decision is, no one is going to question you. that is my concern with the arb. other you find shortcomings in the report? >> i found shortcomings in the process. although i was interviewed for two hours, i was never allowed

of myiew the recording testimony to the board. i was never given an opportunity to read the unclassified report before it was published to see if my testimony had been incorporated or properly -- at all or properly. i have never been given an opportunity to read the classified report. >> thank you very much. >> i thank you. i must admit, one of the rules of this committee is that interviews and depositions the witness actually gets a copy of, to makes -- is allowed a budget that corrections in most cases to make sure the do not respect something. -- they did not misstate something. >> mr. chairman, it is ironic that you say that since mr. thompson was not even engaged with the democratic side of the aisle in terms of answering a

series of questions. but let me first of all say to the family members, we lost extraordinary servants to this country. you lost loved ones, and there is nothing that we can say that will ever heal your huge loss. but know that we will do everything in our power to make sure that other families do not go through what you're going through. to you, mr. hicks, thank you for your extraordinary service. as you were retelling the they were harrowing, it reminded me of an experience that i had similar in a foreign country, ambushed and a sense that we were woefully unprotected.

and i think as part of what we are going to glean from this today is that we have got to do a much better job of providing protection in high risk-let's offices- high threat around the world. i ams inadequate and troubled by the fact that general ham with drew additional support because they had been engaged in a carjacking. if anything, that would heighten our concern and create . war let me ask you a question. you said earlier today that the lawyers told you not to talk when he came. that is what i wrote down.

would you verify that is what you said? caller: we will with ther interview committee, you were asked the .uestion your answer was no, i did not. is that still your testimony ? i don't recall that phrase. >> i thought i would have to review again that i did receive instructions exactly as i said them but i did not know who gave them to me as i did not have at that time access to my e-mail from my time in chirpily.

if you could tell us what page of the transcript that is on? >> i am reading from a separate documents. as he stated, they told me not to be isolated with the congressman. ?s that correct >> yes, that is what i mean. >> that is what i said, not to be personally interviewed by the congressman. you said it's open up isolated with the congressman.

>> there was a classified briefing for mr. chafitz that no other state department official was able to attend. you testified earlier. as a result, no other official can confirm what was said if there was a mis characterization after the fact. so when rep chafitz attended this committee's hearing, there is controversy about his description of that briefing. did you by chance watched the hearing? >> i did not. i do not think i said that no state department official was allowed in the annex briefing. in fact, i was in that briefing. david mcfarland and john martin >> the attorney was not. >> the attorney was excluded by the annex chief for clearance purposes.

>> the gentlelady's time is expired. go ahead and ask your question quickly. >> thank you. i think you deserve to have a post in a location that you desire. so i would like to ask you where would you like to be posted? >> the court of king james is out of the question. >> the country are would most like to go to -- is that the question? and be assigned to it? >> yes. >> i would like to talk to my chief decisionmaker, my family and my wife. because i think her opinion is more important than mine. >> so to conclude, mr. chairman >> he really is a diplomat. >> most of you should be diplomats on issues like this.

she said she was going to help you get a good on work assignment. and i think this committee will help you get a good onward assignment. so we await your, the responsible person for that decision in forming us. >> i thank the gentlelady. and i am shocked that mr. connally did not make that promise to a constituent who can vote. with that, we go to the representative from north carolina, mr. mchenry. >> not to bring the subject matter back to that hearing, but i'm sorry mr. hicks, the senate is in charge of those types of movements of our ambassadors in the confirmation process.

but i hear there is a wide variety of islands to the south of florida that are lovely. but the subject matter of today's hearing is to get at the root cause and the root facts of an awful tragedy that occurred. the mismanagement and a political coverup that resulted from that mismanagement and a rush to judgment by some very ambitious political operatives with in washington. at least that near as i can tell, having gone into the facts as we have today and knowing what we know today. so i want to thank all three of you gentlemen for your service. and i want to say to you that the tough treatment you have gotten as a result of not only on that day in september, but since then is a horrible tragedy. i want to go back to mr. goudy's line of questions. was there protocol within the consulate in the event of a

protest? >> yes, there was. >> was there any evidence when you were there in libya on that day that this was a protest? >> no, there was none. i am confident that ambassador stevens would have reported a protest immediately. the protocol was for us to evacuate immediately from the consulate in move to the annex. >> ok, was there anything in connection to youtube video, was there any awareness that the events occurred because of the youtube video? >> the youtube video was a non- event in libya. >> ok, did you know about that within a couple days or the day of? >> yes. >> and so did you report to anyone in washington with in the

first couple of days that there was anything in connection, a protest in connection to a youtube video? >> no, the only report our mission made to every channel was that there had been an attack on our consulate. >> not a protest? >> no portest. -- protest. on september 16, ambassador susan rice went on to the sunday shows and recited some talking points. were you part of those talking points? >> no. >> so one month later, we had undersecretary kennedy -- let's play his statements. [video clip] >> always made clear from the very beginning that we are giving out the best information we had at the time we were giving it out. that information has evolved over time.

for example, if any administration official, including any career official, had been on television on sunday, september 16, they would have said the same thing that ambassador rice said. she had information from the intelligence community, and that is the same information i have. and i would have made exactly the same points. clearly we know more today but we knew what we knew when we knew it. >> by september 16, did you know what you know what you know, which is apparently what susan rice said? let me make that a question -- rephrase that. ambassador rice recited a set of facts. the state department defends that a month later. you are a career official. would you have said that things that ambassador rice said? >> not after hearing what the president said, especially considering the fact he had gone

to benghazi himself at great personal and political risk. for him to appear on world television and say this was a planned attack by terrorists is phenomenal. i was jumping up and down when he said that. it was a gift from a policy perspective, from my perspective. >> did that occur before september 16? >> he said that on the same talk shows with ambassador rice. >> was their knowledge that he was going to say that? >> there was not. >> mr. chairman i know we have a lot more questions about this, including what that did in country? ambassador rice's rhetoric and the impact it had in country for the work you were doing and the delay that resulted because of that, on the fbi investigation

on the ground. mr. chairman, if you will indulge me and let him answer, please. >> go ahead. >> sorry. again, it took, 17, 18 days from that interview to get the fbi to benghazi. and we dealt with people at a low level and we got them to benghazi by stringing together a series of basically low level commitments to help us get them to benghazi. >> thank you. >> to the families of those who lost their lives in benghazi, you have our condolences. and i think the best tribute we can give to those who have lost their lives is that we make sure this does not happen again. this is the goal of the committee. gentlemen, thank you for being here today. mr. hicks, thank you for your extensive conversation about what happened during the

confusion of the first hours. and all that happened. i can tell you about 16 years ago, i was backpacking through colombia and woke up to a machine gun fire and hand grenades. at the time we did not know what happened. we have paramilitary on the river and guerrillas behind us and we were caught in between. i can fully understand the confusion that happened at that time in your recanting that. what i can tell you is that i do not think there is a smoking gun today. there is not a lukewarm slingshot. what we have is some strong opinions from people who, at least mr. nordstrom participated in the study and mr. thompson, no one stopped him. we have had a chance to take a look at this. i think what is imperative is that we make sure these recommendations are done. that something concrete comes

out of this, that no one else is in this situation. one of the real things we could do as individuals on this committee is to make sure that we provide adequate funding for security and training to all of our embassies. and i think, -- i am one of the new folks around here -- when i look at the past budget where we have been asked for hundreds of millions of dollars that have not been approved and a post- 9/11 world, i look at that as a rather risky. and both mr. nordstrom and mr. hicks you have extensive experience around the world. i think this is probably the night here in the house has had on this issue, so maybe it is time we start looking at how we protect our embassies the best way we can, rather than going through and rehashing the same old stories. my question for mr. hicks and mr. nordstrom, when it comes to extra security, do you feel that we need more in some of the embassies across the world

to make sure that those working have the very best protections? mr. hicks? >> thank you. there are two things. i appreciate the question. we in the state department need more training for people that are going to this critical places, not only for diplomatic security agents but for every day diplomats. in my opening statement i talked about my experience in bahrain of developing contacts to help us get through difficult times in 2002 when our embassy was attacked twice. and we were experiencing very severe anti-american demonstrations. we have to be able to engage. our diplomats have to be on the street. one of the reasons why we were perhaps caught off guard in

benghazi is because for security purposes because we had so few personnel there, the consulate was basically on lock down. and so it was very difficult for our principal officer to get out and mingle with the people and learn what was going on. this was magnified when i talked with a correspondent after the event who had been in benghazi after 9/11. and the correspondent told me that the people of benghazi were terrified by these islamic extremist militias. we did not have that sense prior to 9/11. and the only way we could have that sense was if we are out on the street. i think under secretary of state for public diplomacy said it beautifully, at the tribute last week, when she quoted edward r. murrow about going the last 3 feet.

that is what we as diplomats do. if we are born to be going outside the embassy to meet with people, we have to have the training to be able to respond rapidly and effectively to a desperate situation. so that is one thing. the other thing i believe we need to do -- and i put this forth as part of my platform in running for office in my speech to the foreign service -- we need to develop a robust paradigm for analyzing and mitigating risk. and one that is comprehensible to every member of the emergency action committee. and this would be a powerful tool for our regional security officers to be able to develop the kinds of programs and the kinds of activities that we need to mitigate risks that they identify through the use of this paradigm. >> thank you. we now go to the gentleman from michigan. >> thank you for holding this hearing.

and i, too, agree that this ought to continue with other hearings. it was shocking to your statement about this is rehashing the same old stories. these are not old stories. these are not the same old stories. this is a situation that is atrocious in that it happened. it is about time we heard the stories for the first time we are hearing today. and i thank the witnesses for being here. and i appreciate your valor, appreciate the families and their sacrifice. mr. thompson, on several occasions already it has been insinuated that not only did you not ask to be interviewed by a.r.b., but that you refused. you indicated on a couple of occasions, you asked to be involved. let me give you further opportunity and ask you why were you concerned about the a.r.b.'s failure to interview you, and

did you raise concerns with the department about the review board's unwillingness to interview you? >> the reason i was concerned about it was that it was a errorist event. that process that i have already stated is not one that is bureaucratic. >> on the ground experience, understanding what you were asked to do? >> yes, with respect to places like kenya on august, 1998, in which we had 12 murdered americans, two hundred 40 murdered kenyans and thousands injured.

ambiguous situation in a situation in which we responded fbind collaborated with our colleagues. we had to get office of foreign disaster assistance. we had to get them in there to help with the medical supply because of hospitals were overrun by this event. we had to set up a new embassy because we had one that was destroyed. we had to set up all the indications for the ambassadors. it was a fairly competent of response. such was not the case in tripoli. however, we had a need to get people pushed forward early and even if they did not end up in aaa, they will be closer -- tripoli.

those are the things i would have brought out to the board, had i been interviewed. >> in the of those findings included in the arb report? >> not to my knowledge, but i have not seen a classified version in there. , in deference to my colleague from ohio, i would say on top of all of your the the worst records of achievements and accolades, your degrees from the university of michigan are the best. i appreciate that. let me ask you this, do you know of anyone interviewed by the arb was provided an opportunity to read the full testified report? -- classified report? >> i talked to several witnesses that were interviewed and not have been allowed to read the classified report. as you know, none that were interviewed have read the report? >> as far as i know. >> you mentioned a phone call

with the secretary of state. during that short phone call conversation you were hearst before us, was there any mention of a demonstration during that conversation? >> no. >> it would be interesting to know if that was included in the report. but you have not read it? in fact, it wasn't. >> do you think the report left any bureaucracy off the hook? >> again, as i mentioned earlier, given the decision- respect to the embassy and benghazi operation, undersecretary kennedy has to bear some responsibility. >> what were the shortcomings of the arb process, in your view, besides not interviewing some people and allowing the

classified report to be read? >> again, there was no sonographer in the room -- stenographer in the room when we are interviewed. >> we are talking about editorial commentary potentially as opposed to clear, true accuracy? >> that is correct. there were no takers. .- note takers i had counsel in the room with me taking notes, but other witnesses did not have counsel or may not have had counsel. >> thank you. mr. chairman, -- thank you. congress created the arb in 1986, so we have the ability to professionalize it by congressional action. perhaps that will be something we recommend. we go to the gentlelday from illinois. bravery you for your

in being here today and for your service to our nation. i believe the best way to honor the sacrifice of ambassador stephens and the three other americans who gave their lives in the line of duty in the final act of devotion to this nation, the best thing we can do is to credit -- put aside policy and take a hard look at what went wrong. makeed to move forward to sure this never, ever happens again. ofhare frustration that many my colleagues have expressed that we did not have the opportunity to properly prepare for your testimony today or to participate in a bipartisan investigation. i want to take a look particularly at what we can do to strengthen our mission, in parts of the world where we cannot rely on government to provide accurate security. what do we need do to strengthen our ability in our post? includesntioned, this better security measures and more u.s. security personnel.

mr. hicks, you have said that regarding the arb recognition that you thought it was incomplete, that recommendations it wasbalanced -- insufficiently strong in recommending the state department needed to have more and better training. could you elaborate further on what you believe it needs to be done with improvement in training? isagain, the point i made that for those of us whose job is to engage the local population to represent america to local populations, we have to be able to go outside and meet them in their own places, especially in a part of the world where hospitality is a major part of the culture. and where also, the

demonstration of personal courage is an important part of the culture. ,o that means that we have to as individuals, those of us who go outside have to be able to be cognizant of the situations that we are going into. we have to be situationally --re -- as eric would say in order to recognize in advance that we may be getting into a difficult situation. we need to be able to respond appropriately. if we are put in a situation of extremities, we we have to also have the ability to be able to protect ourselves in that situation. >> thank you. mr. nordstrom, i know you do not have a chance to answer or elaborate on my colleagues question. what is your opinion because i want to make sure we get the lessons learned from this. balance that could

be struck between focusing on improvements to physical security and also focusing on improvements to training or maybe dynamic medication? -- communication? do you have any specific recommendations? in the wake ofs an attack, we will go to the same cycle we have gone through all the time. more money is not always the solution. moore is not always the solution. better is the solution. hadng the process, i somebody ask me as part of the air be whether or not white had i not -- why had i not requested machine guns? said if we are to the point where we have to have machine s at a diplomatic institution, isn't the larger question what are we doing? why do we have staff there?

one of the recommendations that it is ahat is, again, decision-making process. that does not cost money. one of the things we saw again is what is the role of the dramatic security? are they elevated high enough within the department of state organizational structure whereby organizations are heard by the secretary of state? there is a reasonable assertion that some of these issues were not brought to her attention. how do we fix that so that they are brought to the attention of the secretary of state? it is not lost on me that as the unheated messenger this time around, i look at where those messages stop? i look back and i see the last time we had a major attack with east africa. mr. thompson talked about a. who was in that same position

when the unheated messenger of the ambassador in nairobi were raising those concerns? it just so happens it is the same person. the undersecretary for management was in that same role before. if anybody should understand this, i hope that he would. that is why i'm going to the point of there is something inherently wrong with the process of how those security recognitions are raised with the secretary. i agree. i think you have given us a great way forward. thank you, mr. german. >> -- mr. chairman. witnessesou for the for testifying today. thank you for your service. mr. hicks, go blue. mr. hicks, e testified you have not read the final request by the arb report. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> how do you know your

testimony was used appropriately? >> i have no idea. the people who were singled out for disciplinary action, were they allowed to read the final classified report to find out -- >> evidence was used against him? two of those individuals have told me they were not allowed to read the classified report. >> do you believe that the rrb does enough to ensure that a similar tragedy does not happen in the future? anna again, i have not -- >> i have not read the complete report, so i cannot make a judgment at this point. >> did you have an opportunity ?o make input >> i had a two our conversation with the board. >> i'm going to yield some time to the gentleman, mr. chafe it